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Boston-Skegness highlights a mismatch between freight access rights and regional railways.
Back in 1996, Railtrack's then Commercial Director Michael Howells, the ‘friendly face' of what even then was seen as the evil empire, was negotiating track access rights with Ed Burkhardt, the larger than life US short-lines railroader who had bought Trainload Freight. Michael was a stranger to the world of regulated industries. Ed, who in retrospect didn't know what he didn't know, believed he could run Trainload Freight like bigger version of the mom-and-pop short lines, that had successfully taken over the loss making branches as the major US railroads had consolidated.
Just before Christmas 1996, they reached a ‘handshake agreement' on track access for the newly privatised freight company. It was to be an expensive handshake.
Don't forget that privatisation then was still an awfully big adventure. Don't forget, too, that the economy was just climbing out of recession.
Against this background Railtrack had calculated that freight was in decline and structured its offer to EWS accordingly. The access agreement was based on a large fixed cost plus a low go-anywhere variable rate. The thinking was that the fixed cost assured future income, even if railfreight continued to decline.
And, in fact, freight did decline but not, of course, in the way Railtrack expected. Freight customers put fewer tonnes of traffic onto rail, but what they did offer was carried much further.
Restructuring of the steel industry saw large tonnages move between specialist plants, rather than the whole process taking place on one site. And the demise of the deep mined cola industry meant that local collieries, serving power stations with MGR hauls measured in tens of miles, were replaced by imported coal.
With distance hauled more than offsetting the decline in tonnage, tonne miles grew. This was good news all round, except for Railtrack, thanks to EWS' ability to go anywhere for a low mileage charge.
Adding a heavy freight flow on a main line produces a relatively small increment in maintenance. But getting coal from the ports to the power stations involved some secondary routes – such as the Settle & Carlisle line.
In the 1980s, the Sprinterisation of Regional Railways brought multiple benefits. Replacing locomotive-hauled stock with Diesel Multiple Units meant that passengers got a faster and more frequent service. But the DMUs also generated less track wear than the trains they replaced.
As a result the Regional civil engineers were able to declare a maintenance holiday. Effectively, this meant a period of benign neglect until track condition matched the demands upon it, whereupon an appropriate maintenance regime would be introduced.
This maintenance holiday is often jumped on by the ‘decades of under investment' proponents as an example of BR storing up troubles for today. Contrarily, a common plaint in the community railways movement is that secondary routes should not be maintained to 125mile/h standards on rural routes.
And a rural, Sprinter route is what the S&C was, plus a diversionary route for the West Coast Main line. Onto this route, adequately maintained for its existing traffic, EWS threw an intensive flow of coal traffic between Hunterston in Scotland and the Yorkshire power stations.
Not surprisingly, track and structures were not up to the influx of an intensive service of high axle load tonne miles. Ed Burkhardt excoriated Railtrack for not providing the capability his go-anywhere contract was supposed to have paid for and Railtrack had to spend the thick end of £50million upgrading the track.
Why am I raking over old history? Well, on 13 May Network Rail told FM Rail that a charter train to Skegness planned for June 18 would have to be cancelled. An ‘in-depth examination of the route between Boston and Skegness' had revealed ‘certain issues' which could potentially compromise the safe operation of any trains other than a multiple unit.
This examination followed the trial run by FM Rail between Derby and Skegness on 29 March. The trip was aimed at promoting the revival of summer Saturday seaside excursions.
FM Rail provided a rake of coaches marshalled between two Class 31 locomotives. One 31 had a Route Availability 5, while the other from a different subclass was RA6.
Boston-Skegness is a classic rural line and has been maintained as such, probably since privatisation. In other words to take 15 tonne axle load Sprinters.
Jointed rail, including some vintage bull-head profile, is elastic-spiked on softwood sleepers. As jointed track wears you get dipped joints where, in effect, a passing wheel drops into a ‘vee'. At locomotive axle loads the shock of this happening can break the fishplates which join the lengths of rail together.
This is what has happened on Boston =Skegness. Although there is confusion at various levels within Network Rail over which locomotives were responsible – Class 47s rather than the FM 31s being fingered. According to informed sources, three Class 47 runs saw around 30 fishplates broken each time. The FM Rail twin Class 31s broke around six.
But whatever traction EWS would want to use, presumably Class 66s, much of the track is below the minimum standard for such traffic. Five years ago on the similar Grantham to Boston Docks section, the re-introduction of freight services resulted in rapid deterioration of the track and, despite emergency speed restrictions, broken rails and components. Emergency relaying followed.
In parallel with the cancellation of loco hauled specials, Network Rail issued an emergency Network Change, in accordance with the provisions of Access Code G 10,restricting the route between Boston and Skegness to multiple unit traffic only, with immediate effect.
Under G10 Network Rail has to either restore the network to its substantive capability, or issue a formal Network Change statement that sets out the alternative intent, within three months of the original decision being taken. Permanent downgrading is expected
But now the ghost of 1996 emerges. While all this was going on EWS had already been refused access for locomotive hauled freight services between Boston and Skegness. Clearly this infringed the go-anywhere access contract so EWs had made a Section 17 application to The Office of Rail Regulation.
S ection 17 of the Railways Act 1993 allows someone seeking the right to use a railway facility, such as access to the Boston-Skegness branch, to apply for compulsory third party access if they have failed to reach agreement with the facility owner, in this case Network Rail.
So that is going through the regulatory process as I write. And it raises some interesting questions, not least, the standards to which rural lines should be maintained and whether the extra billions paid to Network Rail under the last Access Charge Review, included the cost of maintaining Boston-Skegness to take track crunching Class 66s and 25 tonne axle loads just in case.
Rail freight operators need to react rapidly to new traffic flows if they are to win business from road. But should Network Rail be funded to maintain the fringes of the network to freight standards, just on the off-chance that a freight flow might come up?
And if rural lines are maintained to freight axle load standards, which is a step change in capability and cost, who pays for the re-railing and additional maintenance until a freight flow needs the route? Equally, if these routes are maintained to sprinter standards, freight rates could not cover the cost of upgrading as and when.
Overall, the ORR faces some tricky decision on secondary route capability. We are doing a lot of work on this, says Chairman Chris Bolt
Meanwhile, time to ride an Informed Suurces hobby horse. Back in the days of the state monopoly, civil engineers cascaded rail. When it was no longer suitable for the mainline, the long welded rail train came along, picked up the lengths and took them to a secondary route where they were relayed.
Nowadays, when CWR is lifted it is cut into 5 metre lengths, banded into bundles and sent back to the steelworks as scrap. I am told, by grown up managers, that it is cheaper to scrap and buy new rail, rather than cascade.
Frankly, I don't believe this. Any reader who can prove or disprove it, with actual costs, would do us all a favour.