Return to Archive -by date - by topic - 1999
When the editorial in the xx MR criticised Railtrack's lack of vision and suggested that the barbarians had taken over Rome , Chief Executive Gerald Corbett took the criticism personally.
In a robust defence of his role as Bean Counter in Chief he explained that when he took over at Railtrack there was not the control of the business to which he had been accustomed in other private sector organisations. Specifically, the numbers coming across his desk revealed neither what Railtrack was getting for the money it spent on its contractors nor the quality of service its customers received for their hard earned access charges.
Hence a period of intensive work putting in place what Railtrack calls 'key performance indicators' - from quality of track to minutes lost per train. What gets measured gets done may be a well worn maxim, but it has long been the secret of improving railway performance.
One downside of this prolonged period of intensive bean counting was the well documented cut back in current investment spending. This did not go unnoticed by the Rail Regulator who was looking ahead to the next review of Railtrack's track access charges.
He concluded that the 1998 Network Management Statement with its health warning on most projects, showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm for investment in enhancement. Accordingly, the proposed new financial basis for access charges was based on the perception that Railtrack was a boring utility.
But Gerald Corbett had been promoting his company to the city as a dynamic business, with a share price to match. In justification of this claim we now have the mother of all Network Management Statements. Railtrack has asked the operators what they want and the 348 pages of the 1999 NMS tell us.
Financially, the new projects in this massive 10 year wish list are broken down into what Railtrack will fund on its own (£1.4billion), ‘Partnerships' that will need joint funding (£3.6billion) and those projects which Railtrack will be paid to implement (£2.7billion). This is on top of investment of £1.8billion ‘committed' in the 1998 NMS.
These sums are, of course, dwarfed by the £10.1 billion of renewals scheduled over the same 10 year period. Interestingly this is roughly Railtrack's share of the total subsidy the Train Operating Companies will receive over the same period.
In this context Railtrack still risks looking cautious, at least until the £1.4 billion is really committed, with contracts out to tender and firm start dates, and its contributions to those partnership schemes is clarified.
Which means that it is all for the Railtrack Board to play for. The railwaymen have said what needs to be done. It is now up to the Chief Barbarian and his horde, sorry, Board, to rampage through the City and the halls of Central, Regional and local Government and raise the money to turn the wish list into a solid programme. Some quick successes before 5 July would be advisable if our hard line former columnist is to be assuaged.
When the Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott opens a press conference by sniping at an article by a Sunday paper journalist, when he blusters that British Rail and the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising have ‘formidable powers', when he contradicts his Transport Minister on policy over franchise renegotiation and when he ‘hopes' that incoming Franchise Director will get his vital new Objectives Instruction and Guidance ‘sometime this year', alarm bells ring. True Prescott has a reputation as not the most coherent of speakers, but we remember his exposition of private finance when in opposition, as clear and straightforward.
The concern must be that running what is, in effect, three departments rolled into one, plus the duties of the Deputy Premiership, mean that John Prescott simply no longer has the time to absorb the detail of his former specialist subject. We also detect a lack of direction in the rail sector of civil service machine at DETR's Stag Place headquarters. Say what you will about the Tory Ministers in the Major administration, but to complete privatisation in five years showed that they could run a Department.
With the top man overloaded, greater responsibility must devolve on Transport Minister Dr John Reid, who must surely have played himself in by now. But the real centre of gravity of railway policy is shifting along Victoria Street from Stag Place to the Sir Alastair Morton and his new model British Railways Board in Great Queen Street .
Sir Alastair is clear that issues of ‘power' are a red herring. You don't need power to plan strategy for the future railway. Of course, currently, the real power lies in Holborn with the Rail Regulator, who as we know, is thirsting for some serious sword play with Railtrack and the Rolling Stock Companies.
Alone among the four ‘railway dogs' pictured in the national striding purposefully along the platform at Peterborough Station, the Rail Regulator is neither distracted nor has a learning curve to climb. But at the time of writing he had lost two of the heavyweights in the ORR.
But ovwerall, just as Railtrack and the operators are starting to get their post privatisation act together, the lack of coherence at the very top of the industry is worrying.