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Along the rolling hills and valleys of the economic cycle; across the swingometer's indication of changing political advantage; in the long run British Rail generally did better under Conservative governments. By ‘better' we mean that more investment projects were authorised. And by ‘investment' we mean the now archaic usage which refers to money spent on steel and concrete, aluminium and copper and, in the 21 st century, silicon and software.
While this statement may be counter-intuitive, consider what went on while Margaret Thatcher was in No 10. Widely perceived as being anti-railway, in less than a decade of sustained economic growth, she presided over the transformation of regional services, electrification of the East Coast Main Line, the creation of Network SouthEast, including the first Thameslink, and the re-equipment of the freight businesses.
Frequently, it is the Thatcher legacy on which today we depend . And many of the projects brought to fruition (or not) under labour were initiated under John Major's administration in the early flush of privatisation. The West Coast Route Modernisation for example, Thameslink 2000, plus the first new train fleets.
Of course, much was expected of Labour with John Prescott in charge of Transport. While the Deputy Prime Minister has become a figure of fun, we remember him as a most effective Transport shadow spokesman,
With the pro-active encouragement of his appointee at the SRA , Sir Alastair Morton, who was nothing if not visionary when it came to strategic investment, Mr Prescott launched his 10 Year Transport plan in 2000. While it seems wildly over-ambitious to our post-Hatfield sensibilities, at the time, with Sir Alastair's help, we could just about reconcile the aspiration with the finance.
Hatfield, of course, changed everything. In particularly, everything became much more expensive. And the 10 year Transport Plan has since become an embarrassment at question times in the House of Commons.
But, after a short blip, and driven by 57 consecutive quarters of sustained economic growth since 1997, the longest period of growth this country has seen, according to Transport Secretary Douglas Alexander, ridership kept on growing – as it always has with a rising economy
In a speech to a Transport 2000 on 14 November Mr Alexander said that ‘as the economy has grown we are increasingly dealing with the symptoms of success, not the problems caused by years of under investment'. But as we noted earlier, the brunt of this growth is mainly being borne by the last great surge of investment two decades ago. In the real world, we are even now living through years of underinvestment.
In his speech, Mr Alexander boasted of ‘unprecedented, sustained spending on the railway'. And he deserves credit for not describing it as ‘investment'.
Because the £5billion of taxpayer's money going into the railway, with the same again from its customers, is being spent on maintaining the status quo. And while we welcome Network Rail's renewals programmes, particularly the recent revival of spending on signalling, it is just that – renewals.
When it comes to real investment projects, the Government simply dare not engage – supporting our opening theory. Consider its recent announcement of the planning go-ahead for Thameslink 2000.
This emphasised that achievement of planning permission ‘did not amount to a final go-ahead for the project'. Permission had been granted, said the statement, ‘without prejudice' to a decision on the scheme's funding.
When a Government Department starts using legal caveats to curb expectations, you can smell the prevarication in the air. And more of the same is being floated for Sir Rod Eddington's review of long term transport policy, publication of which is imminent and, significantly, is likely to be linked with the Chancellor's pre-budget report.
We see signs of expectation management in the leaks claiming that a draft copy of the Review, rules out the proposed North South High Speed Line in favour of increasing capacity through longer trains and platforms. This is all of a piece with the new South Western franchise where one of the busiest, if not the busiest, London Commuter services sees little or no genuine investment in capacity for the next 10 years.
South West Trains was, of course, one of Sir Alastair's 20 year franchises, the longer term aimed at encouraging the train operator to invest private funding. Before it proved financially unworkable, Stagecoach was proposing not only a 10 car railway with platforms to match, but schemes to unlock pinch points by removing flat crossings.
Now, South Western, with its soaring premium payments over the next decade, has to find extra capacity from within existing resources. No 10 car railway for 2016 – just fewer seats and toilets to provide more standing room.
At which point, our customary editorial detachment turns to anger. Not so long ago, 57 quarters of unbroken economic growth would have seen railway investment soaring and subsidy diving.
After 57 quarters of unbroken economic growth a fully functioning railway would have already lengthened trains and platforms as a matter of course and turned its mind to more substantial ways of increasing capacity.
That in the midst of such rising demand, and with the railway flooded with unprecedented subsidy, longer trains and platforms are today seen as unaffordable is a scandal.